This is Part 3 of the Climate Change: A post-Bali Agenda series
The question of how to tackle climate change straddles the boundaries between science, engineering, economics and policy-making, the most critical and sensitive of which being the interface between science and policy. Having examined the risks from a scientific angle it’s time to turn our attention to policy, and most importantly the risk of policy failure.
The traditional role of policy makers has been to recommend optimal strategies for achieving an objective, or set of objectives, within fixed set of boundaries. This approach fails when it comes to tackling climate change for several reasons. First and foremost, developing effective climate change policy is not about designing an optimal policy solution with a fixed and acceptable level of risk. It is about developing a set of policies for which the risk of failure is absolutely minimal, as the consequences of failure far outweigh the economic benefits of accepting that risk. However, this is further complicated by the fact that the boundaries for policy formation are not fixed, although fortunately there is the scientific consensus that they are highly unlikely to become less restrictive. As such the context for climate change policy formation is one where there should be an inherent expectation that the current boundaries will become more restrictive over time, most likely a short period of time, and therefore policy formation needs to be flexible enough to account for this and recommend strategies that allow for rapid responses to changes in the best available evidence.
These points were summed up in Pittock (2006):
"Uncertainties in climate change science are inevitably large, due both to inadequate scientific understanding and to uncertainties in human agency or behavior. Policies therefore must be based on risk management, that is, on consideration of the probability times the magnitude of any deleterious outcomes for different scenarios of human behavior. A responsible risk management approach demands that scientists describe and warn about seemingly extreme or alarming possibilities, for any given scenario of human behavior (such as greenhouse gas emissions), even if they appear to have a small probability of occurring. This is recognized in military planning and is commonplace in insurance. The object of policy-relevant advice must be to avoid unacceptable outcomes, not to determine (just) the (apparently) most likely outcome."
Pittock, B. (2006) "Are Scientists Underestimating Climate Change?" Eos 87(34), 22 August 2006. (Eos is the weekly newspaper of the American Geophysical Union).
There is now a clear case that no more risk assessment needs to be done, and that policy formation, the root of which should be the Precautionary Principle, should proceed based on the environmental, social and economic risks of not achieving significant emissions reductions. For the
“Finally, we suggest that it is now critical to decide how urgent the problem is. If we are correct, then a precautionary approach requires near immediate efforts to ‘bend the curve’ of global emissions, and much steeper reductions than are currently contemplated.
Thus policymakers and scientists alike will have to decide quickly whether the assumptions we have made are reasonable. Our own conclusion is that further resolution of uncertainty is in effect policy-irrelevant, and that we do not have time to wait for more precise estimates of risk.”
(IPPC, 2006, 'High Stakes')
When we accept the simple conclusion that failure to reduce emissions to even the level negotiated by the IPCC constitutes a fundamentally unacceptable risk we are then forced to consider the risk of policy failure, and therefore account for that risk in policy formation. Despite successive efforts ranging from international to national to local, it is extremely difficult to find examples of policies that have succeeded in achieving their emissions reduction targets. The reasons for this are complex and varied, however there is a wealth of evidence to conclude that the risks considered by any emissions reduction policy must include a significant element of risk attributable to their failure. It is not the job of scientists to put a figure on the risk of policy failure, however it is the job of economists to place a value on the cost of failure, and in light of this overwhelming evidence policy makers need to apply a precautionary approach to avoiding this cost.
The mechanisms needed to deliver the changes we need to be seeing now include such anathemas to neo-liberal economists as regulation, carbon taxation, and subsidies for low carbon technologies. For these to be implemented effectively carbon has to be priced correctly, and not just carbon but the environmental, social, economic and even security costs of living with the effects of climate change. Further measures such as Emissions Trading Schemes need to lever the market and level the playing field, in particular between the developed and developing worlds. Scientists can influence economists and policy makers in this respect by providing evidence on which to base the costs of carbon and predictions of the impacts of climate change, but these will count for nothing unless the paradigm in which policy is being formulated is not a risk averse one. In a perfect market it is arguable that such measures would not be needed however, as stated in the conclusions of the UK's 2006 Stern Report, they are necessary because:
‘Climate change is the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen.’
Keith Baker, Technology and Science Editor (05/03/08)